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JApAneSe fdi in chinA: 
determinAntS And performAnce*
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) into China is analysed using an FDI model 
that accounts for different modes of FDI as well as third country effects and adds to 
existing literature by incorporating a new measurement of political distance. Political 
closeness between countries is shown to affect FDI. An improvement in political 
relations is associated with an increase in FDI by reducing uncertainty in the invest-
ment environment. The performance of Japanese FDI into China is shown to be high 
relative to its potential since the late 1980s. The signing of the bilateral investment 
treaty in 1988 and China’s WTO accession in 2001 were events that helped reduce 
uncertainty in bilateral investment, with the latter mitigating the effects of increased 
uncertainty from rising bilateral political tensions after 2001.
This article was the runner-up for the AJRC's Crawford Award for 2008 
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most important dimensions in the economic 
relationship between Japan and China. China’s economic rise has been achieved in large 
part due to its openness to the rest of the world, and importantly through its policies to 
attract foreign firm participation, first in production for export and later in its domestic 
economy. At the same time, Japanese multinational enterprises (MNEs) in key manufac-
turing industries such as electronics have been able to stay competitive by moving much 
of their production to China and the rest of East Asia. 
 FDI flows from one country to another face barriers and resistances. The analysis 
of barriers and resistances is much more prevalent in studies that model the flow of goods 
than those that model the flow of FDI. The case of trade is reviewed in a study by Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2004) where trade over a border is estimated to face resistances 
equivalent to a 170 per cent tariff. The economic distance between two countries can be 
represented by the cost of getting investment flows to another country. On average, FDI 
will flow to countries with close economic distance, not necessarily geographic distance, 
as they face less barriers to investment. Economic distances vary due to the ease or resist-
ance to capital flows between countries. Some of the key characteristics of economic and 
political distance are discussed below.
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 This study measures the resistances to FDI flows by combining two important 
streams of literature which have sought to analyse foreign direct investment (FDI) re-
lationships, both of which have developed almost exclusively of each other without any 
significant overlap. One is the international business or global strategy literature that 
concerns itself with cultural differences, institutional differences and the choice of mode 
of entry of MNEs given uncertainty caused by those and other resistances (Hymer 1960; 
Kogut and Singh 1988; Ghemawat 2007). The other is younger and less established 
than the international business or international trade literature and is concerned with 
modelling MNE activity with such factors as country resource endowment differences 
reflecting comparative advantage, spatial effects in a multilateral sense and also scale of 
economies (Helpman 1984; Markusen 1984; Carr et al. 2001; Markusen 2002; Egger 
and Pfaffermayr 2004; Davies 2008). 
 Combining analysis of both strands of FDI literature would seem to allow model-
ling consistent with theoretical derivations based on spatial linkages and different modes 
of FDI, with accounting for resistances similar to those that receive much more focus in 
the international business literature (see Ghemawat 2007). 
 This study also includes a measurement of political distance as part of the analysis 
and estimation of FDI. Political distance is a measure of how ‘close’ two countries are 
politically, or geopolitically and how well they get along. Two countries who are political 
and security allies can be described as being close in terms of political distance, whereas 
two nations that are political rivals, perhaps in the extreme, can be described as politically 
distant. Political distance is a potentially important factor in affecting intangible resist-
ances, as bilateral political tensions can erode confidence in the investment environment 
and increase uncertainty. 
 The purpose of this study is twofold. First, it measures the performance of Japanese 
FDI into China by obtaining a measure of all resistances to investment flows. This is done 
by measuring the determinants of FDI according to the most theoretically consistent and 
best performing model for FDI, which accounts for third country, or multilateral effects, 
to estimate what potential Japanese FDI flows into China might be. The estimation of 
determinants allows for the measurement of a counterfactual amount of FDI. The results 
are compared to overall Japanese outward FDI as well as FDI into China from the United 
States and Europe, the other main sources of China's FDI. As the model already controls 
for third-country effects, the results can estimate the resistance to investment flows after 
accounting for investment diversion. Second, it seeks to measure the influence of political 
factors on flows of investment worldwide with a focus on the relationship between Japan 
and China. The inclusion of a political relationship variable allows for a measurement of 
the impact of changes in uncertainty in the bilateral investment climate. 
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 The paper is organised as follows. The first section is an explanation of hypothesised 
resistances to FDI and how these might affect FDI. Then the theoretical models of FDI are 
reviewed before the model and data for this study are explained in detail. This is followed 
by discussion of results. The FDI modelling allows comparisons against counterfactual 
FDI levels which are discussed for both Japanese outward FDI as well as Chinese inward 
FDI. Finally, a model with political distance is incorporated and explained before a final 
section which concludes.
Distance in FDI
FDI between countries faces resistances. These resistances contribute to the economic 
distance between economically linked countries where economic distance can be thought 
of as the transit cost of capital flows. FDI flows often face different resistances over similar 
geographic distances necessitating a measurement of those resistances and the effects on 
the scale and structure of FDI. 
 The concept of resistances is used widely in trade literature, often called trade 
frictions or psychic distance (Beckerman 1956; Linnemann 1966; Drysdale and Garnaut 
1982). Resistances can include easy-to-measure, explicit trade or investment barriers and 
geographic distance as well as those factors that inhibit or promote investment flows that 
are difficult to measure such as uncertainty, asymmetric information and hidden costs. 
 The MNE international business literature focuses on differences between countries 
and the implications for the modes of entry into markets by MNEs. Resistances have a 
significant impact on the scale and structure of FDI (Ghemawat 2007). 
 Guiso et al. (2004) find that a measure of trust and a measure of cultural similar-
ity, the latter determined by religion, history of conflicts and genetic similarities, affect 
economic linkages in European countries, including FDI. They recognise that these are 
separate from tangible resistances which can be measured more objectively. 
 The role of resistance to FDI is also investigated by Erramilli and D’Souza (1995) 
who use the term cultural distance to describe the uncertainty that a firm faces in investing 
in another country. They separate uncertainties into internal and external uncertainty, 
where internal uncertainty is related to a firm’s uncertainty about the potential host 
market and external uncertainty is volatility in the host market itself and is unrelated, or 
external, to the home country of the firm deciding to invest. Their results suggest that 
increases in either type of uncertainty increase resistances but in different ways and with 
different implications. An increase in internal uncertainty will increase what they term 
cultural distance and could lead to a decision to trade instead of invest. Trading does 
not commit as many resources as directly setting up a plant in a foreign country and is 
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therefore hypothesised to be less sensitive to increases in uncertainty. This result hinges 
on an assumption that the FDI would be horizontal in nature and aimed at servicing the 
domestic market. 
 The separation of uncertainty into factors associated with an increase in uncertainty 
relating to that market or country, and those that apply to a specific firm or source country 
is important. An increase in political distance between Japan and China, which increases 
uncertainty and therefore resistance, is an internal risk according to the characterisation 
of Erramilli and D’Souza (1995) that should only affect Japanese firms but not other 
sources of FDI. Their findings do not automatically carry the implication that Japanese 
firms will substitute trade for FDI as Japanese FDI, like other FDI into China, is not solely 
horizontal FDI aimed at market share. Vertical and knowledge-based FDI have different 
determinants from horizontal FDI (Carr et al. 2001) and the response may be less elastic 
to host market changes. Determining the specific form of FDI would be difficult as FDI 
modes can vary within the same industry and even within the same firm. Also, isolating 
different shocks (those that affect internal and external uncertainty) on different kinds 
of FDI is difficult. This paper instead will compare Japanese FDI into China with FDI 
from the other main source countries over a period involving shocks of both kinds. The 
aim here is to measure economic distance in FDI and to measure the effects of increased 
uncertainty that is specific to a bilateral relationship (internal uncertainty) as well as un-
certainty that is country specific (external uncertainty).
 Political distance is one measure of internal uncertainty. A bilateral measure of 
political distance has not been included in any cross-country analysis of FDI flows, but 
a measure of host country domestic political risk has been included in studies such as 
Baltagi et al. (2007). The interaction between trade and a measure of political distance 
has a rich literature (See Polachek 1980; Pollins 1989a; Pollins 1989b; Polachek 1997; 
Reuveny and Kang 200). This study attempts to fill the void in the literature and includes 
the influence of political distance on FDI.
FDI models
Models that seek to explain FDI flows are not as widely used as, and do not have the 
theoretical underpinnings of, the gravity model of trade, reflecting in part the only recent 
rise in the importance of FDI in the analysis of international economic relations. The link 
between FDI and trade has led to a rush of studies using traditional gravity variables of 
economic size and distance to explain FDI flows. Recent research suggests, however, that 
FDI is better explained when differences in modes of FDI are taken into account (Egger 
and Pfaffermyer 2004; Blonigen 2005).
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 The earlier general equilibrium models of FDI by Markusen (1984) and Helpman 
(1984) set the foundations for the current understanding of MNE behaviour. Markusen 
developed a model of horizontal FDI where MNEs produce offshore from the country of 
their headquarters to avoid trade costs such as transportation and tariffs. This form of FDI 
can be characterised as market-seeking FDI, where a firm will set up a plant to produce 
and sell in that host market. This development in the literature came concurrently with 
Helpman’s model of vertical FDI where MNEs take advantage of different factor prices 
across countries to cut production costs. Simply put, vertical FDI is trade-increasing and 
horizontal FDI is trade-reducing. 
 Recognition of the existence of a combination of both vertical and horizontal types 
of FDI within MNEs led to later studies combining the two models into a knowledge 
capital (or knowledge-based) model of FDI (Carr et al. 2001; Markusen 2002; Markusen 
and Maskus 2002). Knowledge capital models describe FDI operations where the research 
and development, as well as other skilled-labour-intensive, or knowledge-intensive activi-
ties, are geographically separated from production (Carr et al. 2001). The separation of 
such activities in general means that knowledge-based activities can be supplied at low 
cost to numerous production locations (Carr et al. 2001). These models made significant 
steps towards understanding MNE behaviour but were general equilibrium models in a 
simple two-country framework and therefore not adequate in explaining or characteris-
ing MNEs which made their FDI decisions based not only on home and host-country 
characteristics, but also on other-country characteristics. 
 The inclusion of spatial effects, or third-country effects, is similar to developments 
in the gravity model of trade that recognise that trade is occurring in a many-country 
world. Multilateral effects have become commonplace in gravity models since the seminal 
paper by Anderson and van Wincoop (200). The empirical work in FDI studies, which 
take account of spatial effects and FDI patterns beyond the horizontal and vertical types 
of FDI, confirms the importance of taking account of third-country effects. 
 The strong interdependencies between trade and investment led to many studies 
where FDI was modelled using gravity model determinants of trade, and these models 
were relatively successful at explaining FDI (see, for example, Brenton and Di Mauro 
1999; Razin et al. 2002; and Eichengreen and Tong 2005). However, as Blonigen and 
Davies (2000) show, the knowledge capital models of FDI consistently explain FDI better 
than the gravity model of trade determinants. Blonigen (2005) details the determinants 
of FDI, based on a survey of empirical studies, which are different from the determinants 
of trade. Differences in factor endowments and hence comparative advantages determine 
not just the amount of FDI as it would for trade flows, but the mode of FDI, depending 
on the abundant factor. 
6Asia Pacific Economic Papers
 Theoretical derivations of models which estimate FDI are based on firm decisions 
where the choice to trade or invest is endogenous and depends on economies of scale, 
factor prices, country risk and transportation costs (Dee 2007). 
 The model used in Baltagi et al. (2007) allows for four types of FDI: vertical, hori-
zontal, export platform and complex vertical. The last two, export platform and complex 
vertical, are knowledge-capital type FDI which include third-country effects. MNEs have 
increasingly employed an export platform model, or complex horizontal model, of FDI 
where a production plant is set up in a low cost country solely for the purpose of exporting 
to nearby markets. This form of FDI is apparent in East Asia where production networks 
dominate trade and investment.  The complex vertical model of FDI represents a pattern 
of production where plants are set up in two countries offshore and the goods are traded 
back to the country that was the source of the FDI. 
 Consistent with Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007), the parent company coun-
try is denoted d, the host country of the investment is denoted i and the third market is 
denoted j. 
 Dee (2007) illustrates the four patterns of FDI:
Horizontal:   plants in d and i, exports from d to j
Export platform:  plants in d and i, exports from i to j
Vertical:   plants in i and j, exports from i to d
Complex vertical:  plants in i and j, exports from j to d
Many studies model a two factor world, some with skilled and unskilled labour (see for 
example Davies (2008)) and others with capital and labour. Results found in studies such 
as Egger and Pfaffermayer (2004), Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007) show that a 
three- factor world with skilled labour (or human capital), unskilled labour and physical 
capital, gives a better explanation of FDI flows. 
 The literature on MNE behaviour and FDI models has shown the importance of 
including scale, distance, relative factor endowments, the interdependencies between mar-
kets and networks of production (multilateral effects). A measurement of risk is included 
in Baltagi et al. (2007) without theoretical justification. The inclusion is justified as it 
relates to the empirical evidence of uncertainty increasing in one country and affecting 
all FDI to that country. The increase in uncertainty increases resistance. The measure of 
risk which is included in other studies is not bilateral relationship specific and therefore 
can be thought of as a measure of external uncertainty — involving risk external to a 
bilateral relationship. 
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Model and data
The model used in this study follows closely that of Dee (2007) which is based on Baltagi 
et al. (2007). 
Ft = β0 + β1dis + β2Gt + βSt + β4kt + β5ht + β6lt + β7Γt + β8Θt + β9Rt + β10FTAt
+ β11WGt + β12WSt + β1Wkt + β14Wht + β15Wlt + β16WΓt + β17WΘt 
+ β18WRt + β19WFTAt + ut        (1)
Where
Ft is the log of FDI (both stock and flows are used)
dis is the log of the great circle distance between capital cities of d and i.
Gt is the log of the sum of country d and country i GDPs: ln(GDPd + GDPi)
St is a measure of GDP similarity: (1 – sd
2 – si
2) 
where sd = GDPd /(GDPd + GDPi) and si = GDPi /(GDPd + GDPi)
kt is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country capital stock: ln(Kd/
Ki)
ht is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country human capital: ln(Hd/
Hi)
lt is the log of the ratio of source country to destination country unskilled labour: ln(Ld/
Li)
Γt is an interaction term between Gt and kt: Gt kt
Θt is an interaction term between distance and the difference in capital and labour ra-
tios: 
 dis(kt – lt)
Rt is a measure of risk in the FDI recipient country 
FTAt is a variable that takes the value of one if country d and i have a free trade agree-
ment in force in year t. 
W is a measure of multilateral effects interacted with each term. WGt, for example, is 
the inverse distance weighted average of Gt between the source country and all third 
country markets. 
 The initial analysis will measure performance, defined as the actual amount of FDI 
relative to what the determinants predict. Those FDI relationships between source and 
host countries that perform well have lower resistances compared to those that do not 
perform well which are considered to face higher resistances. The second stage of the 
analysis includes measure of political distance and an inverse distance weighted average 
8Asia Pacific Economic Papers
measure of political distance to explain some of the resistances that are difficult to meas-
ure. The measure of political distance is included explicitly as it is an important part of 
the Japan–China relationship (Armstrong 2007). The bilateral political distance variable 
is limited to the sub-period of 1990–2004. 
 The model follows Dee (2007) in its treatment of potentially spatially correlated 
error terms deterministically with the inclusion of an FTA variable and a weighted FTA 
variable. Baltagi et al. (2007) use the Gauss–Markov estimator to control for spatially 
correlated error terms. Baltagi et al. do not include a distance variable in their model, 
as is done here in Model 1, because they control for distance in the spatially correlated 
error term. 
 FDI source countries are the United States, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands comprising seven of the largest eight FDI sources 
globally.1 There are ninety recipient countries used and they are listed in the data annex. 
Both FDI stocks and flows were used and FDI data are from OECD which has FDI data 
reported by OECD countries to OECD and non-OECD member countries. The panel 
is highly unbalanced from 1982 to 2006. Dummy variables for time are included and 
results controlling for both unobserved country-specific effects and country-pair effects 
are calculated and discussed. 
 GDP at purchasing power parity is used and is taken from the World Development 
Indicators along with labour force and gross fixed capital formation data. Capital stock 
is calculated from the perpetual inventory method from Leamer (1984) and explained 
in the data annex. The human capital data, from the International Labour Organisation 
and various national statistical agencies, is the absolute number of graduates from tertiary 
institutions, such as universities, in that country. The sum of the unskilled labour popula-
tion and the population with a tertiary qualification is equal to the total labour force.
 Table 1 is from Baltagi et al. (2007) and shows the hypothesised signs of coef-
ficients based on the theoretical model developed in Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) and 
extended in Baltagi et al. (2007). 
 The measure of risk introduced in Baltagi et al. is not found to be statistically 
significant in explaining FDI stocks or foreign affiliate sales in their model but the same 
variable is significant in Dee (2007). In this study, the Economic Freedom Index of the 
Fraser Institute2 is used and is expected to have a positive effect on FDI. The risk variable 
used by Baltagi et al. and Dee had a negative coefficient. Sensitivity tests are conducted 
using the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators4 with the assumption that all three variables are indi-
cators of country risk. These country-specific risk variables all affect external uncertainty 
and are external to (not exclusive to) bilateral relationships. An increase in the measure 
of host country risk will affect all source country FDI.
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Table 1 Hypothesised signs of variable coefficients in FDI model
Explanatory variable Mode of FDI 
 Horizontal Export-platform Vertical Complex vertical
Bilateral size of d + i  + + + + 
Similarity in size (d, i) +/- + -/+ +/- 
Capital ratio (Kd/Ki) + + + + 
Human K ratio (Hd/Hi) + + + + 
Labour ratio (Ld/Li) - - - - 
Bilateral size* Kd/Ki + + + - 
(Kd/Ld)/(Ki/Li)*t + + - +/- 
 
Multilateral effects
Bilateral size of d + j  + + + + 
Similarity in size (d, j) + + +/- +/- 
Capital ratio (Kd/Kj) - + + - 
Human K ratio (Hd/Hj) + + - - 
Labour ratio (Ld/Lj) + - + - 
Bilateral size* Kd/Kj + + - + 
(Kd/Ld)/(Kj/Lj)*t + + +/- +
Source: Baltagi et al. (2007).
Results
The results for estimating FDI stock are presented in Table 2. There are two models 
estimated with both country-specific effects and country-pair effects, both controlling 
for fixed effects.
 Most variables are statistically significant at a high degree of significance in explaining 
FDI stock. The similar Baltagi et al. (2007) specification and even closer specification of 
Dee (2007) did not have as many variables with statistical significance as do the results in 
Table 2. As was the case in Baltagi et al. (2007) the multilateral variables (those weighted 
by inverse distance) are jointly significant, confirming their importance in explaining 
FDI. 
 The unbalanced panel was tested for auto-correlation using the method described in 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and the existence of auto-correlation was rejected. A Hausman 
test rejected the random effects specification over the fixed effects specification in all cases. 
The discussion that follows in the next section is based on the fixed effects results. 
 FTAs between source and destination countries have a positive and significant 
effect on FDI. The negative sign of the inverse-distance-weighted FTA variable, WFTA, 
in the results controlling for country-pair effects means that FTAs between source, d, 
and third countries, j’s, reduce FDI from the source country to the destination country 
i but this variable is not statistically significant in this study. Investment diversion is not 
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found for FDI flows in Table . Dee (2007) found that investment provisions in FTAs 
and other agreements did not impact on FDI patterns in the Asia Pacific region and her 
finding is inconsistent with the findings in this study. The destination countries are not 
aggregated into regions and detailed investment provisions in FTAs are not included as 
in Dee (2007) so that these agreements are not directly comparable. 
 Results for FDI flows are similar to those of FDI stock estimation and are presented 
in Table . The number of observations is less for FDI flows than FDI stock as the FDI 
data in the OECD data set was sparser for flows. The results are included to show the 
similarities in variable significance and consistency between stock and flow variables. FDI 
stock data are used in Baltagi et al. (2007) and Dee (2007) as is common in modelling 
FDI activity. The results from Table 2 will be the focus of the rest of the study. 
 In Table 2 distance is negative and highly significant. Baltagi et al. (2007) do not 
include distance as they are controlling for it in the second stage regression on spatially 
correlated error terms. Their inclusion here explicitly confirms previous empirical stud-
ies that distance matters. Bilateral economic size and similarity of GDPs are positive and 
significant, lending support to horizontal models of FDI (Markusen 1984). Scale is a 
significant explanator of FDI. 
 The GDP and capital ratio interaction term is negative when the country-specific 
fixed effects are controlled for and positive when the country-pair fixed effects are con-
trolled for. In the first case, the positive impact diminishes with market size consistent 
with vertical FDI (Baltagi et al. 2007). When controlling country-pair unobservable 
characteristics, the mode of FDI is less obvious.  
11
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Table 2 Outward FDI stock: model estimation results
	 Country	specific	effects	 Country	pair	effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
  with  with 
  3rd country  3rd country
Log of 
distance -0.906*** -0.845***    
 (0.0496) (0.0509)    
Bilateral  
GDPs 2.361*** 2.273*** 2.133*** 3.063***  
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.223) (0.245)  
GDP  
similarity 4.428*** 3.989*** 5.024*** 4.635***  
 (0.301) (0.313) (0.688) (0.701)  
Rel. capital  
ratio 3.329*** 3.669*** -2.319*** -4.381***  
 (0.448) (0.450) (0.666) (0.694)  
Rel. human K ratio 0.183*** 0.226*** 0.172*** 0.300*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0319) (0.0355) (0.0384)  
Rel. labour ratio 0.0796 0.0290 1.889*** 1.841*** 
 (0.0435) (0.0436) (0.134) (0.134)  
gamma -0.134*** -0.146*** 0.0757** 0.149***  
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0230) (0.0241)  
phi 0.204*** 0.187*** 0.0419 0.0347  
 (0.0358) (0.0355) (0.0346) (0.0341)  
freedom 0.598*** 0.580*** 0.320*** 0.304***  
 (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0257) (0.0253) 
fta 0.433*** 0.370*** 0.378*** 0.342***  
 (0.0826) (0.0853) (0.0751) (0.0738)  
 
Multilateral variables     
wg  0.160  -0.0246  
  (0.0939)  (0.0471)  
ws  -58.01***  27.75**  
  (14.37)  (9.307)  
wk  1.324*  -0.130  
  (0.555)  (0.280)  
wh  -0.714**  -0.648***  
  (0.268)  (0.136)  
wl  0.686***  0.549***  
  (0.189)  (0.0902)  
wgamma  -0.0180  0.00831  
  (0.0228)  (0.0114)  
wphi  -0.164  0.0437  
  (0.157)  (0.0765)  
wfreedom  0.0701  -0.165  
  (0.381)  (0.184)  
wfta  1.431  -0.390  
  (2.039)  (0.981)  
_cons      
 -59.20*** -56.85*** -61.34*** -89.31***  
 (3.345) (3.836) (6.285) (7.099) 
N 4307 4307 4307 4307 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the five per cent level, one 
per cent and 0.1 per cent levels, respectively.
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 The source-to-destination fixed capital ratio is significant across all models but has 
a positive effect when country-specific fixed effects are controlled for and a negative effect 
when country-pair effects are controlled for. A positive and statistically significant effect 
of the capital ratio is what is expected for all modes of FDI according to the theoretical 
hypothesised signs in Table 1. The negative and statistically significant results for coun-
try- pair effects are not consistent with theoretical priors but the results of Baltagi et al. 
(2007) are only statistically significant in two of their eight estimated models. The relative 
capital stock between source and destination countries is not a reliable indicator of the 
mode of FDI as the sign does not inform or distinguish between FDI modes although 
the statistical significance shows that it is important to control for.
 The human capital ratio between source and destination is positive and statistically 
significant which is consistent with all four modes of FDI. The unskilled labour ratio is 
not statistically significant in most of the model specifications estimated. This result is 
surprising as it indicates unskilled labour ratios are not a significant explanatory factor in 
FDI. FDI from countries with low endowments of unskilled labour, such as Japan, is not 
aimed at countries with abundance of low-skilled labour once all else is controlled for. The 
result is consistent with Baltagi et al. (2007). However, the spatially weighted unskilled 
labour variable is statistically significant and has a positive effect across all specifications 
(FDI stocks as well as flows) consistent with modes of horizontal FDI and vertical FDI 
but not knowledge-capital FDI (Table 1). This may be a result of the length of the time 
period considered which dates back to 1982, before MNEs had complex network be-
haviour in their FDI and trade patterns. A substantial period after 1982, up to the latest 
data available, 2006, was covered and the statistical significance of the other spatially 
weighted variables and the joint significance for all spatially weighted variables is evidence 
of complex FDI. 
 Estimations are conducted using indexes of governance and corruption instead 
of economic freedom to test the sensitivity of the variables that proxy for risk. Another 
sensitivity test that is conducted is for the strict functional form assumption, taking the 
log of the sum of both GDPs. In the theoretical derivations of Markusen (2002), Carr 
et al. (2001) and Baltagi et al. (2007), there is a consensus that the sum of source and 
destination GDPs are a determinant of FDI but a log-linear form is taken in most models 
for ease of estimation. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the result of sensitivity tests where 
GDPd and GDPi are included separately, and governance and corruption are substituted 
for economic freedom. The results show that relaxing the functional form of the GDP 
measures does not change the results significantly. This means that the ability to estimate 
the effects of host- and source-country GDP (and, indeed, third-country GDP) separately 
could give more flexibility in estimating and explaining the determinants of FDI. The 
statistical significance of both the corruption and governance measures, and comparable 
results for other variables, show the model is not particularly sensitive to the kind of 
measure used for risk. This is not surprising, as Baltagi et al. (2007) include ‘a measure 
of risk’ as an afterthought in their model derivation and could have just as easily included 
a measure of economic freedom or governance.
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Table 3 Outward FDI flows: model estimation results
	 																								Country	specific	effects		 Country	pair	effects 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  
  with 3rd country  with 3rd country
 
Log of distance -0.906***  -0.845***      
 (0.0496)  (0.0509)      
Bilateral GDPs 2.361***  2.273***  2.133***  3.063***  
 (0.114)  (0.116)  (0.223)  (0.245)  
GDP similarity 4.428***  3.989***  5.024***  4.635***  
 (0.301)  (0.313)  (0.688)  (0.701)  
Rel. capital ratio 3.329***  3.669***  -2.319***  -4.381***  
 (0.448)  (0.450)  (0.666)  (0.694)  
Rel. human K ratio 0.183***  0.226***  0.172***  0.300***  
 (0.0312)  (0.0319)  (0.0355)  (0.0384)  
Rel. labour ratio 0.0796  0.0290  1.889***  1.841***  
 (0.0435)  (0.0436)  (0.134)  (0.134)  
gamma -0.134***  -0.146***  0.0757**  0.149***  
 (0.0155)  (0.0156)  (0.0230)  (0.0241)  
phi 0.204***  0.187***  0.0419  0.0347  
 (0.0358)  (0.0355)  (0.0346)  (0.0341)  
freedom 0.598***  0.580***  0.320***  0.304***  
 (0.0286)  (0.0286)  (0.0257)  (0.0253)  
fta 0.433***  0.370***  0.378***  0.342***  
 (0.0826)  (0.0853)  (0.0751)  (0.0738) 
Multilateral variables         
wg   0.160    -0.0246  
   (0.0939)    (0.0471)  
ws   -58.01***    27.75**  
   (14.37)    (9.307)  
wk   1.324*    -0.130  
   (0.555)    (0.280)  
wh   -0.714**    -0.648***  
   (0.268)    (0.136)  
wl   0.686***    0.549***  
   (0.189)    (0.0902)  
wgamma   -0.0180    0.00831  
   (0.0228)    (0.0114)  
wphi   -0.164    0.0437  
   (0.157)    (0.0765)  
wfreedom   0.0701    -0.165  
   (0.381)    (0.184)  
wfta   1.431    -0.390  
   (2.039)    (0.981)  
_cons -59.20***  -56.85***  -61.34***  -89.31***  
 (3.345)  (3.836)  (6.285)  (7.099) 
N 4307  4307  4307  4307 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the five per cent level, one 
per cent and 0.1 per cent levels, respectively.
14
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
Performance
The performance measure is the residual, or the normally distributed error term, which 
shows the actual FDI value relative to what the model of FDI determinants predicts. The 
composite error terms are:
 udit = edi + ηdit for the country pair fixed effects model and 
 udit = ed + ηdit for the country specific fixed effects model 
where η is the usual normally distributed error term and e is the fixed effect. The differ-
ence is that the fixed effect error component, e, is fixed over pairs or source and destina-
tion, d and i, for the country pair fixed effects and for only the source country, d, in the 
country specific effects model. 
 Gravity models of trade have been used for estimating unexhausted or untapped 
trade by estimating a trade potential or natural trade volume (Baldwin 1994; Baldwin et 
al. 1997; Egger 2002). They define unexhausted trade as the deviation of actual trade 
to what the model predicts as the natural rate, estimated by the determinants and their 
parameter estimates. Egger (2008) applies the concept to FDI and calculates bilateral 
FDI potentials and deviations from potentials for Austrian FDI. 
 Actual FDI deviates from what the determinants predict due to measurement error 
or because of omitted variables which are omitted because of various reasons including 
their difficulty to measure. 
 Estimation of an FDI model without inclusion of some resistance variables has the 
potential for omitted variable bias. Yet the choice of explanatory variables differs from 
model to model. Which resistance variables should be included in the? The answer to 
this is to follow the theory and use a model with theoretical underpinnings. Many studies 
include resistance variables of interest in explaining trade or FDI, however, often without 
justifiable reasoning other than statistical significance and obtaining parameter estimates 
for policy implications. FDI models such as that of Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), Baltagi 
et al. (2007) do not include subjective resistances as their derivations from theory do 
not allow for them (except for the host-country risk variable that is included without 
explanation or theoretical basis). 
 In calculating FDI potentials, Egger (2008) does not use a model of FDI that has 
any theoretical underpinnings and therefore it is not clear that the choice of determinants 
that are included are appropriate. In fact, Egger models FDI activity (three models using 
foreign assets, number of foreign affiliates and number of foreign employees) using GDP 
as the only explanatory variable.
 Figure 1 shows the performance of FDI in China by Japanese, German, US and 
British firms. The data for Figure 1, as well as performance of Canadian, French and 
Dutch firms, is shown in Table 4 with results for both country-specific and country-pair 
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fixed effects. Figure 2 shows performance of Japanese FDI in China, Hong Kong and the 
rest of the world. When the residual takes a value of zero it means that FDI was at the 
level that the model predicts given the scale, endowment ratios and other determinants. 
A value above this means higher than predicted performance and below means low per-
formance.
Figure 1 FDI stock performance into China, controlling for country-pair effects, 1982–
2006
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note:  Japanese outward FDI flows and stocks are not available for the year 1995 in the OECD 
data set. Pre-1995 data and post 1995 FDI data are sourced from different Japanese statistical agencies or 
computed on a different basis so a structural dummy variable was included in the estimation.
 
 Controlling for country-pair fixed effects allows a measure of the changes in FDI 
between country pairs over time, holding all else constant. This specification controls 
for observable and unobservable factors that do not change over time, among them 
geographical distance. 
 Controlling for country-specific fixed effects does not change the shape of the lines 
in Figure 1 significantly, but it changes the relative positioning of each source country and 
their ranking (Table 4). Japanese FDI to China is the highest performing in 2006, after 
controlling for the determinants, and is in fact the highest performing for the periods 
1986 to 1994 and 1997 and 1998, similar to the case where country-pair fixed effects 
are controlled for. Japanese FDI outperformed FDI from all other source countries in 
the sample between 1987 and 1991, and again in 1997 and 1998 (Figure 1 and Table 
4).
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 When measuring the performance of FDI relative to what its determinants would 
predict, it is also useful to consider not controlling for those country-pair fixed effects that 
are unobservable. Distance is already accounted for in the model estimation and there is 
a chance that other unobservable factors that stay constant between country pairs reveal 
a different story from that of Figure 1. Both sets of results are presented in Table 5 with 
the panel on the right hand side reflecting the case where country-specific fixed effects 
are controlled for. The numbers from Figure 1 are presented in the left hand panel of 
Table 4 which includes Canada, France and the Netherlands as well.
Table 4 FDI stock performance into China
	 	Controlling	for	country-pair	fixed	effects	 	 	Controlling	for	country-specific	fixed	effects 
Year Can Fra Ger Jpn Ned UK US  Year Can Fra Ger Jpn Ned UK US
1982       -1.4     -0.7  1982       -2.4     -2.3 
1983     -1.7   -0.2  1983     -2.7   -2.0 
1984     -1.0   0.3  1984     -2.1   -1.6 
1985    -1.1 -1.0   0.2  1985    -2.9 -2.5   -2.0 
1986    -1.3 -0.7   -0.5  1986    -3.1 -2.1   -2.8 
1987   -0.5 -1.0 0.8   -0.6  1987   -2.1 -2.7 -0.7   -3.2 
1988   -0.5 -0.2 0.3   -0.1  1988   -2.1 -1.9 -1.2   -2.8 
1989   -0.5 -0.4 0.3   -0.4  1989   -2.4 -2.0 -0.9   -1.8 
1990   -0.4 -0.7 0.4   -0.5  1990   -2.1 -2.2 -1.1   -2.2 
1991 -0.8 -0.2 -0.3 0.3  -0.2 -0.5  1991 -3.0 -1.7 -1.8 -0.9  -2.1 -2.1 
1992 -0.6 0.3 -0.1 0.2  -0.4 -0.5  1992 -2.6 -1.2 -1.6 -0.7  -2.1 -2.0 
1993 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -1.6 -0.1 -0.4  1993 -1.2 -1.4 -1.6 -0.7 -3.6 -1.9 -1.8 
1994 0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.7 0.3  1994 -1.4 -0.9 -1.7 -0.5 -1.7 -2.6 -1.1 
1995 0.6 0.5 0.4  0.4 -0.6 0.1  1995 -1.1 -0.7 -1.2  -1.6 -2.3 -1.1 
1996 0.4 -0.1 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.5  1996 -1.4 -1.1 -0.4 -0.7 -1.7 -1.7 -0.8 
1997 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.6  1997 -1.6 -0.8 -0.7 0.1 -1.6 -1.8 -0.7 
1998 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.2 -0.6 0.4  1998 -2.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3 -1.9 -2.4 -0.9 
1999 0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6  1999 -1.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.4 -1.7 -1.3 -0.8 
2000 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.7  2000 -2.2 -0.9 -0.9 -1.4 -1.7 -1.5 -0.7 
2001 -0.2 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4  2001 -2.5 -1.1 -1.1 -1.6 -1.9 -1.5 -1.2 
2002 -0.4 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1  2002 -2.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.3 -1.9 -1.1 -1.4 
2003 -0.3 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0  2003 -2.4 -1.2 -0.9 -1.3 -2.1 -1.9 -1.4 
2004 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.1  2004 -2.2 -1.3 -0.9 -1.1 -2.6 -2.0 -1.3 
2005 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.3 -0.4 0.3 0.1  2005 -2.3 -1.4 -0.9 -1.0 -2.5 -1.9 -1.4 
2006 0.0 -0.1  0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.2  2006 -2.1 -1.4  -0.9 -2.7 -2.2 -1.5 
                    
Fixed          Fixed 
Effect 7.8 6.7 6.6 6.9 8.7 6.4 4.1  Effect 0.8 1.4 -0.3 -2.2 8.7 2.2 -4.7
Notes:  1. Can = Canada, Fra = France, Ger = Germany, Jpn = Japan, Ned = Netherlands, US = USA. 
 2. Japanese outward FDI flows and stocks are not available for the year 1995 in the OECD   
 data set. Pre-1995 data and post-1995 FDI data are sourced from different Japanese statistical  
 agencies or computed on a different basis so a structural dummy variable was included in the  
 estimation.
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 Figure 2 shows Japanese FDI performance into China, Hong Kong and an 
average of the rest of the world. The reason Hong Kong is included is that FDI 
into Hong Kong may ultimately be destined for China through Hong Kong as has 
been the case with trade flows, in earlier times (Hanson and Feenstra 2001). Japa-
nese FDI performance in China is represented by the same line in Figures 1 and 2. 
Figure 2 Japanese FDI performance controlling for country-pair effects
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note:  Japanese outward FDI flows and stocks are not available for the year 1995 in the OECD data set. 
Pre-1995 data and post 1995 FDI data are sourced from different Japanese statistical agencies or computed 
on a different basis so a structural dummy variable was included in the estimation.
 
 It is useful to review Japanese FDI performance in China in three sub-periods. The 
first is the underperformance in the early 1980s, the second is the high performance in 
the 1990s and lastly the final period from 2001. 
The 1980s
Japanese FDI was well below what the determinants predicted until the mid-1980s. The 
rise occurred around the time of the Plaza Accord and the subsequent rapid appreciation 
of the Japanese yen. The sudden appreciation of the Japanese yen made Japanese exports 
less competitive and so many Japanese MNEs shifted production offshore. 
 However, judging from Figure 2, the Plaza Accord was not the cause of Japanese 
FDI increasing in China, as Japanese FDI to Hong Kong and elsewhere was performing 
close to what determinants would predict throughout this period. The Plaza Accord af-
fected all Japanese outward FDI in a similar way as it was not just an appreciation vis a vis 
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the Chinese currency but against the US dollar and most international currencies. Figure 
1 shows performance of German FDI in that period confirms that the Plaza Accord alone 
was not the cause of the rise in performance.
 The under-utilisation of FDI potential was related to the still relatively closed 
Chinese domestic market. Japanese firms were especially risk averse in investing in China 
when there was little access to domestic markets and they feared that Chinese partners 
would appropriate their technology for production directed at their home and other 
international markets (the so called ‘boomerang effect’) (Fukuda 1998; Luo 2001). 
Only 16 per cent of Japanese FDI in China was by large MNEs in 1986, with FDI being 
dominated by small and medium enterprises (Luo 2001:74). There was a fundamental 
change in Japanese perceptions of investment in China around 1986–1987 in response 
to a strategic shift in investment policy in China as access to domestic markets by foreign 
investors was opened up. This opening up was undertaken in conjunction with the signing 
of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) of 1988. By 1987 FDI performance had become 
positive and relatively high. The rapid inflow of FDI into China from Japan was helped 
as the BIT reduced uncertainty. It is difficult to separate out the effect of the BIT and 
determine causation as it is not clear whether the BIT was the cause of the initial inflow 
of FDI or a response to it.
 The period leading up to 1986 can be characterised as Japanese FDI facing high 
resistances in moving to China because of an FDI policy environment that limited access 
to domestic markets and caused particular uncertainty about investing in China within 
Japanese firms. Other resistances, such as certain barriers to foreign firm entry that could 
be overcome at a cost, such as by entry into the Chinese market via Hong Kong, also 
played a role, but the high level of uncertainty about Chinese policy and the asymmetric 
information from a less open market would have been the resistances that dominated. 
 1986 was the year that Chinese policy changed in two significant ways. Firstly, 
fiscal and financial incentives were given to attract foreign companies in a move to open 
up China to the rest of the world.5 In fact, this was the year that solely foreign-owned 
enterprises were legalised in China (National People’s Congress 1986). Secondly, and 
perhaps more significantly, this was the year that talks resumed for China to enter the 
GATT. The bandwagon effect (Knickerbocker 197) where MNEs will follow rivals into 
a foreign market can be seen by the sudden flood of Japanese FDI inflow at that time. 
The 1990s
Performance in the 1990s was very high as Japanese FDI into China accelerated and 
was significantly higher than the model predicts. The peak came in 1997 before a drop 
around the time of the Asian financial crisis. The 1990s were when China embarked on 
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large scale trade liberalisation and other reforms aimed at WTO accession (Drysdale and 
Song 2000; Lardy 2002). Commitment to the global trading system through unilateral 
trade liberalisation and reforms that were difficult, if not impossible, to reverse gave 
Japanese and other firms confidence in investing in China (Drysdale and Song 2000). 
Trade liberalisation would have reduced tangible resistances such as barriers to trade, but 
again, intangible resistances would seem to have played a larger role as China’s reforms 
aimed at moving towards a market economy system closer to what the Japanese firms 
were used to would have reduced uncertainty. The gradual opening up of the Chinese 
domestic market would also reduce asymmetric information. 
 Survey results of potential destinations for Japanese FDI have consistently ranked 
China as number one. The Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese 
Manufacturing Companies undertaken every year (since 1989) by the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation Institute (JBICI) is a comprehensive survey with an average of 
around 600 Japanese MNEs surveyed a year in the last five years involving over 10,000 
overseas affiliates. Figure  shows the destinations which Japanese investors see as most 
promising countries/regions for overseas business operations and their relative rank. 
Figure 3 Promising countries/regions for Japan overseas business operations over the 
medium term, 1995–2007
Source: JBICI, various years. 
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 In the 2007 JBICI survey 80 per cent of companies cited ‘future growth potential 
of local market’ as a reason for operating in China.  China has been ranked number one 
every year since at least 1995, but its relative position peaked in 200 and has been falling 
since. India and Vietnam have been gaining, as has Russia, in relative terms. 
 Resistances to FDI were low during this period as the BIT and institutional reforms 
reduced resistances which continued to fall as China liberalised trade. Figure  reveals 
the growth of confidence that Japanese firms had in investing in China. 
The 2000s
The period from 1997 is of particular interest for Japanese FDI into China as there is 
a significant and large fall and then, in 2001, a small yet significant trend upwards. The 
period from 1999 to 2005 shows the United States, United Kingdom and Germany 
perform much better than Japan (Figure 1) and compared to what the determinants 
would predict. 
 Is the underperformance of Japanese FDI in China during that time because Japa-
nese firms faced more resistances compared to firms from other source countries? The 
rise of China as by far the most attractive destination for FDI from 1998 shows almost 
an inverse relationship to the performance of Japanese FDI in China which falls in that 
period. An upside down u-shaped curve for the survey in Figure  is almost a mirror 
image of the u-shaped curve of performance between 1998 and 2006. 
 To answer this question, Japanese FDI to the rest of the world, as well as the po-
litical distance between Japan and China during that time, are both discussed. 
 Figure 2 shows that Japanese FDI movements in different destinations are gener-
ally in the same directions. Hong Kong appears to have played a role as a substitute FDI 
destination before 1986 as uncertainty in dealing with China was high. The signing of 
the bilateral investment treaty in 1988 reduced uncertainty and perhaps meant that Hong 
Kong was used less as a channel through which to send FDI into China with Japanese 
FDI instead going into China directly. This can be seen by Japanese FDI to Hong Kong 
falling over time. FDI flows to the rest of the world are much closer to what the model 
predicts. The important finding in Figure 2 is that Japanese FDI to China outperformed 
Japanese FDI to the rest of the world in every year since 1987. 
 For FDI into China, there is a turning point around 2001 and a steady rise in 
Japanese FDI performance since (Figures 1 and 2). Japanese FDI into China may not 
have been performing well compared to other source country FDI but it is above Japanese 
FDI performance to the rest of the world and only marginally under its predicted value 
(the value zero in Table 4) for a the period 1999–200.
 The political distance variables for Japanese ‘sentiment’ towards China are presented 
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in Figure 4, separated into both positive and negative variables (negative was subtracted 
from positive for the net variable in the earlier analysis). The year 2001 was an interest-
ing year for the Japan–China relationship as it marked the beginning of a period of high 
political tensions which resulted in suspension of leadership visits for six years and it co-
incided with China becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Both 
the negative and positive variables rose significantly in 2001. 
Figure 4 Japanese political distance towards China, 1990–2004
Source: Data are extracted from King (200).
Note:  Negative events are a 6-month moving average and positive events are a 12-month moving   
 average. 
 The net effect of the political positives and negatives are difficult to determine from 
Figure 4 alone. Given the Goldstein (1992) weighting of events, Figure 4 shows China’s 
WTO accession offsetting the rising negative political sentiment with positive economic 
sentiment. The next section investigates the effect of political distance on FDI.  
Political Distance
A measure of political distance between countries is added to the analysis to capture the 
effects of internal uncertainty on FDI and the results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 4. The variable is from King (2006), called Integrated Data for Events Analysis 
(IDEA), and is event data coded from Reuters Business Briefs. Events, both positive and 
negative actions, are coded into monthly bilateral data and aggregated to annual data over 
the period 1990– 2004.6 Positive and negative data are weighted in a scale of severity in 
similar yet more detailed fashion to a well established body of literature on the interac-
tion between trade and conflict or cooperation. Mansfield and Pollins (200) survey that 
literature and review the evolution of the data methodology. The data are described in 
more detail in the Data Annex. 
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Table 5 Political distance and FDI: country-specific fixed effects
  
	 Country-specific	fixed	effects 
   With time lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
	 flows	 stocks	 flows	 stocks
 
distance - - - - 
 0.533*** 0.794*** 0.627*** 0.865*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0723) (0.0870) (0.0776) 
g 1.690*** 1.447*** 1.935*** 1.551*** 
 (0.185) (0.156) (0.180) (0.157) 
s 4.186*** 5.100*** 4.024*** 5.002*** 
 (0.486) (0.410) (0.487) (0.417) 
k 3.000*** 3.333*** 4.181*** 4.052*** 
 (0.720) (0.575) (0.686) (0.553) 
h 0.188*** 0.294*** 0.176*** 0.295*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0388) (0.0502) (0.0413) 
l -0.0405 -0.0461 -0.0208 -0.0605 
 (0.0617) (0.0547) (0.0637) (0.0569) 
gamma -0.113*** -0.135*** -0.156*** -0.161*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0199) (0.0235) (0.0191) 
phi 0.0563 0.201*** 0.124* 0.244*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0462) (0.0540) (0.0472) 
freedom 0.595*** 0.759*** 0.518*** 0.648*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0400) (0.0453) (0.0401) 
wg 0.418 0.0868 0.236 -0.122 
 (0.683) (0.639) (0.695) (0.653) 
ws -115.7*** -122.6*** -110.7*** -117.7*** 
 (24.74) (22.87) (25.04) (23.41) 
wk 0.767 4.427 2.663 5.061 
 (3.182) (2.494) (3.317) (2.614) 
wh 1.101 -1.198** 0.486 -1.711*** 
 (0.700) (0.427) (0.712) (0.443) 
wl 0.504 0.209 0.576 0.277 
 (0.429) (0.294) (0.437) (0.303) 
wgamma -0.0948 -0.234* -0.164 -0.259* 
 (0.123) (0.0972) (0.127) (0.101) 
wphi -0.660 0.225 -0.509 0.341 
 (0.516) (0.235) (0.528) (0.243) 
wfreedom 2.403 -1.601 1.555 -2.619* 
 (1.678) (1.302) (1.691) (1.330) 
fta 0.458*** 0.312** 0.483*** 0.332** 
 (0.135) (0.119) (0.137) (0.121) 
wfta 1.858 6.573 -2.034 4.017 
 (4.999) (3.885) (5.092) (3.988) 
politics 0.00531*** 0.00445*** -0.00130*** -0.00118** 
 (0.000798) (0.000724) (0.000375) (0.000362) 
wpolitics 0.00907 0.0108 0.0107 0.0167 
 (0.0115) (0.00895) (0.0118) (0.00930) 
_cons -48.90** -11.95 -45.07** 1.318 
 (17.25) (14.66) (17.38) (16.14) 
N 2026 2602 1943 2478
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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 The negative events are subtracted from the positive events to obtain a measure 
of net political closeness. As in utility theory the assumption here is that positive events 
cancel out negative events to a certain extent. Therefore a positive value for the politi-
cal variable indicates political closeness and a negative value indicates widening political 
distance. A movement in a positive direction implies a narrowing political distance. The 
results reported in Table 5 are based on a political distance variable that has FDI source 
country reporting news events towards the FDI host country. Different constructions of 
the political distance variable are tested below.
 The political distance measure is not controlled for in the earlier analysis of FDI 
performance as their inclusion will limit the analysis to the period 1990–2004. Columns 
1 and 2 in Table 5 show results similar to the results before but with political distance 
included.
 There is ample evidence that causality runs both ways between trade and political 
distance and that the lag lengths of causation vary (Pollins 1989a; Pollins 1989b; Reuveny 
and Kang 200). To account for this in the link between FDI and political distance, a 
lagged political distance variable is included. The one-year lag is roughly consistent with 
other findings and more appropriate than a two-year lag (Reuveny and Kang 200) and 
also controls for causality running from economic distance to political distance. There is 
much evidence that changes in economic relations influence political relations (Polachek 
1980; Mansfield and Pollins 200). Improvements in a political relationship would not 
be expected to have impacts on the economic relationship, and vice versa, immediately, 
but often with a lag as economic agents and foreign policy stances adjust. The results 
with a lagged political distance variable are shown in columns  and 4. 
 The results presented in Table 5 show that the measure of bilateral political distance 
has a statistically significant effect on FDI for both FDI stock and flows when country- 
specific fixed effects are controlled for. When country-pair fixed effects are controlled for 
(see Appendix), this is not the case and suggests that country-pair fixed effects already 
control for political distance. Country-pair fixed effects control for factors in the bilat-
eral relationship that do not change over time such as geographic distance. The fact that 
country-pair fixed effects seem to control for bilateral political distance may mean that 
there is no significant variation over time between bilateral pairs in the sample. 
 There is evidence of improving political relations being associated with an increase 
in FDI. The inverse-distance weighted political distance variable was not found to be sta-
tistically significant. The results in Table 5 only include the political distance measure for 
source country event analysis reporting on the FDI host country. For example, it shows 
that an increase in positive news reports from a source country which mention the host 
country — an indicator of the source country warming to the host country — is associ-
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ated with an increase in FDI from source to host. Appendix A sets out sensitivity test 
results where FDI from country A to country B is similarly affected by political distance 
measures based on reports in country B towards country A, as well as the sum of both 
directions of political distance. The results do not differ significantly and suggest that a 
measure of one country’s perceptions towards another is correlated to the other country’s 
perceptions of it.
 The statistical insignificance of the political distance variable when country-pair 
specific fixed effects is controlled for may suggest that there is not enough variation across 
time in the variable despite Figure 4 showing otherwise for Japan and China. 
Conclusions
FDI for the seven of the world’s largest eight FDI source countries was modelled with 
multilateral effects. The results confirm the importance of including multilateral effects 
that are inverse distance weighted effects of third-country variables, which is a recent 
development in the literature. 
 A measurement of political distance is included to capture uncertainty which is 
internal to a bilateral economic relationship and shown to have a significant effect on 
FDI. A worsening of the political relationship, or widening of political distance, has the 
effect of reducing FDI between those two countries, holding all else constant. There was 
no evidence of a change in a bilateral political relationship having effect on FDI flows 
outside of that bilateral pair, that is, between those countries and other countries. 
 This result has significant implications for estimating and modelling FDI and, in 
particular, Japanese FDI into China which was the focus of the study. Performance of 
Japanese FDI into China was compared with the performance of other source country 
FDI into China as well as the performance of Japanese FDI to the rest of the world. This 
was done by creating a counterfactual, and predicting what FDI would be expected to 
be given the determinants of FDI flows. 
 Japanese FDI vastly underperformed in China in the early 1980s. In that period, 
risk- averse Japanese firms faced a high degree of uncertainty in investing in China and 
MNEs did not start to enter in any substantial scale until Chinese policy shifted in the 
late 1980s. This move towards opening up of the Chinese domestic economy coincided 
with the Plaza Accord, but the signing of the BIT between Japan and China had more 
effect. The BIT reduced uncertainty and gave investing firms a framework which increased 
confidence in committing resources in China. 
 Chinese trade liberalisation and domestic reform in the 1990s — which continued 
China’s opening up and was aimed at WTO accession — resulted in Japanese FDI perform-
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ing highly through most of the 1990s until the Asian financial crisis. The commitment 
from China to the international trading system as well as a gradual reforms towards a well 
functioning market economy, through difficult to reverse reforms, reduced resistances by 
increasing confidence and reducing uncertainty. The Asian financial crisis saw all Japanese 
FDI fall, not just to China. 
 Bilateral political tensions between Japan and China rose significantly in 2001 but 
the measure of political distance did not widen significantly as China’s WTO accession 
offset negative political sentiment with positive economic sentiment. The result was a 
turning point in Japanese FDI performance which had been trending downwards. There 
was no significant underperformance in the period 2001–2006 when political tensions 
were high. In fact, compared to Japanese FDI performance overall, FDI into China did 
well.
Data Annex
Capital stock
Following Leamer (1984) and common practice (see Dee 2007 and Baltagi et al. 2007) 
the capital stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. This is calculated 
using gross fixed capital formation, K, at time t with the formula Kt = 2∑t+2t-2 It , where 
I is investment with t sufficiently less than 1982, the period under study. 
FDI destination (or host) economies
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belize, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, UK, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, USA.
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Political distance data
The measure of political distance is from conflict/cooperation data from King’s (200) 
dataset of Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) which is an extension and refine-
ment of the World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS) data set. There are more categories 
of conflict and cooperation in IDEA than in WEIS or Conflict and Peace Data Bank 
(COPDAB). Monthly bilateral conflict and cooperation variables for Japan–China, Ja-
pan–United States and United States–China were extracted for the period 1990–2004. A 
net cooperation variable constructed by differencing conflict from cooperation and results 
below show that this practice, which is common in the literature, places too much of a 
restriction on the data, when compared to results of analysing conflict and cooperation 
separately.
 Cooperation is represented by positive political or non-political event in a relation-
ship, generally from one country towards another. A report of ‘Japan increasing overseas 
development aid (ODA) to China’ would be a cooperative event from Japan towards 
China. Conflict is represented by a negative political or non-political event such as ‘na-
tion-wide protests in China against Japanese interests’ or ‘Japanese Prime Minister’s 
visit to Yasukuni shrine angers China’. For the net cooperation variable, a value of zero 
means no event or the weighted positive event (cooperation) has cancelled out the equally 
weighted negative event (conflict). 
 The events are machine coded from Reuters Business Briefs using Virtual Research 
Associates (VRA) software and the results are shown to be more accurate and consistent 
than high skill human coders (King and Lowe 200). The events covered report most 
actions from one country towards another including such events categorised as comment, 
consult, approve, promise, grant, reward, agree, request, propose, reject, accuse, protest, 
deny, demand, warn, threaten and demonstrate. All events are given weights consistent 
with Goldstein (1992) to capture severity and extended from WEIS.
 Net cooperation is used in this study. The assumption here is that a positive event 
will to some extent cancel out, or have the opposite effect on, a negative effect. The vari-
ables are analysed separately to confirm the importance of a net measure. Net conflict 
(conflict minus cooperation as opposed to the other way around) is used in other studies 
(Polachek 1980; Pollins 1989a). 
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Appendix A Sensitivity tests
Table A1 Sensitivity tests of different risk variables
 (1) (2) (3) 
 w governance w corruption separate GDPs
distance - - - 
g 2.307*** 2.541***  
 (0.540) (0.240)  
s 1.382 3.003*** 0.138 
 (1.490) (0.693) (0.801) 
k -7.493*** -4.177*** -3.507*** 
 (1.739) (0.722) (0.702) 
h 0.115* 0.299*** 0.334*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0430) (0.0396) 
l 1.534*** 2.679*** 2.014*** 
 (0.198) (0.150) (0.136) 
gamma 0.254*** 0.143*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0250) (0.0243) 
phi -0.0434 0.0372 0.0439 
 (0.0425) (0.0341) (0.0341) 
govern 0.603***   
 (0.120)   
wg 0.381 -0.0106  
 (0.343) (0.0501)  
ws -15.34 27.48** 26.71*** 
 (15.59) (9.198) (8.079) 
wk 3.193** -0.510 0.407 
 (1.203) (0.287) (0.327) 
wh 0.437 -0.505*** -0.456** 
 (0.243) (0.145) (0.145) 
wl 0.524 0.449*** 0.602*** 
 (0.338) (0.0970) (0.0944) 
wgamma -0.107* 0.0159 -0.0106 
 (0.0457) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
wphi -0.848*** 0.129 -0.0120 
 (0.209) (0.0819) (0.0811) 
wgovern 5.094***   
 (1.356)   
fta -0.0456 0.228** 0.315*** 
 (0.0939) (0.0762) (0.0740) 
wfta -2.210 -0.235 -2.173 
 (1.285) (0.927) (1.213) 
corrupt  -0.0867***  
  (0.0165)  
wcorrupt  -0.255  
  (0.184)  
GDP source   2.205*** 
   (0.624) 
GDP destination   1.298*** 
   (0.116) 
freedom   0.311*** 
   (0.0253) 
whost   -2.27e-12* 
   (9.22e-13) 
wfreedom   0.117 
   (0.213) 
_cons -68.83*** -72.87*** -98.83*** 
 (19.67) (6.969) (17.90)
N 2697 4025 4307
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A2 Sensitivity test of directional political distance on FDI for country- specific fixed 
effects 
	 FDI	flows	 	 	 FDI	stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 6) 
 Source Destination Both Source Destination Both 
 toward toward  toward toward 
 destination source   destination source
distance -0.533*** -0.536*** -0.536*** -0.794*** -0.798*** -0.797*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0815) (0.0816) (0.0723) (0.0721) (0.0722) 
g 1.690*** 1.570*** 1.612*** 1.447*** 1.363*** 1.397*** 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.186) (0.156) (0.158) (0.157) 
s 4.186*** 4.107*** 4.135*** 5.100*** 5.039*** 5.063*** 
 (0.486) (0.484) (0.485) (0.410) (0.409) (0.409) 
k 3.000*** 2.781*** 2.779*** 3.333*** 3.114*** 3.145*** 
 (0.720) (0.716) (0.720) (0.575) (0.576) (0.577) 
h 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 0.294*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0387) 
l -0.0405 -0.0595 -0.0491 -0.0461 -0.0584 -0.0517 
 (0.0617) (0.0615) (0.0615) (0.0547) (0.0546) (0.0546) 
gamma -0.113*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.135*** -0.127*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0248) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0200) 
phi 0.0563 0.0625 0.0599 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.203*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0462) (0.0461) (0.0462) 
freedom 0.595*** 0.595*** 0.598*** 0.759*** 0.762*** 0.763*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0400) (0.0397) (0.0398) 
wg 0.418 0.234 0.359 0.0868 -0.0186 0.0434 
 (0.683) (0.687) (0.682) (0.639) (0.650) (0.642) 
ws -115.7*** -116.0*** -116.2*** -122.6*** -121.3*** -121.8*** 
 (24.74) (24.69) (24.68) (22.87) (22.84) (22.82) 
wk 0.767 -0.129 0.102 4.427 4.399 4.155 
 (3.182) (3.147) (3.224) (2.494) (2.551) (2.559) 
wh 1.101 1.011 1.075 -1.198** -1.223** -1.194** 
 (0.700) (0.698) (0.699) (0.427) (0.426) (0.426) 
wl 0.504 0.427 0.466 0.209 0.132 0.176 
 (0.429) (0.423) (0.426) (0.294) (0.289) (0.291) 
wgamma -0.0948 -0.0577 -0.0690 -0.234* -0.230* -0.223* 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.0972) (0.101) (0.100) 
wphi -0.660 -0.705 -0.669 0.225 0.191 0.206 
 (0.516) (0.514) (0.515) (0.235) (0.238) (0.236) 
wfreedom 2.403 2.569 2.492 -1.601 -1.403 -1.490 
 (1.678) (1.644) (1.662) (1.302) (1.290) (1.296) 
fta 0.458*** 0.484*** 0.470*** 0.312** 0.329** 0.319** 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
wfta 1.858 3.142 2.658 6.573 7.252 6.976 
 (4.999) (4.992) (4.992) (3.885) (3.877) (3.879) 
politics 0.00531*** 0.00736*** 0.00333*** 0.00445*** 0.00642*** 0.00283*** 
 (0.000798) (0.000942) (0.000447) (0.000724) (0.000890) 
(0.000412) 
wpolitics 0.00907 0.0174 0.00653 0.0108 0.0126 0.00653 
 (0.0115) (0.0163) (0.00714) (0.00895) (0.0133) (0.00568) 
_cons -48.90** -43.14* -46.07** -11.95 -8.273 -10.24 
 (17.25) (17.57) (17.24) (14.66) (14.79) (14.70)
N 2026 2026 2026 2602 2602 2602
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table A3 Political distance and FDI: country-pair fixed effects
    With time lag 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
	 flows	 stocks	stocks	 flows	 stocks
distance     
     
g 1.986* 2.097*** 2.238* 2.362*** 
 (0.894) (0.509) (0.879) (0.500) 
s 4.000 3.017* 5.147* 3.588** 
 (2.290) (1.338) (2.261) (1.322) 
k -7.824* -7.409*** -8.595** -7.456*** 
 (3.182) (1.631) (3.105) (1.601) 
h 0.129 0.206*** 0.168 0.188*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0540) (0.0973) (0.0555) 
l 1.193*** 1.527*** 1.183*** 1.481*** 
 (0.321) (0.198) (0.345) (0.210) 
gamma 0.245* 0.242*** 0.274* 0.245*** 
 (0.112) (0.0577) (0.109) (0.0567) 
phi 0.00933 0.00794 0.0379 0.0129 
 (0.0985) (0.0590) (0.0981) (0.0598) 
freedom 0.305*** 0.336*** 0.294*** 0.300*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0367) (0.0619) (0.0360) 
wg -0.198 -0.237 -0.306 -0.189 
 (0.497) (0.316) (0.497) (0.316) 
ws -95.65** -17.98 -92.00** -19.55 
 (34.56) (19.03) (34.23) (18.97) 
wk 3.766 3.458** 4.259 3.524** 
 (2.446) (1.247) (2.469) (1.264) 
wh 0.159 -0.411 0.0707 -0.619** 
 (0.535) (0.211) (0.535) (0.216) 
wl 0.356 0.439** 0.345 0.451** 
 (0.324) (0.137) (0.325) (0.138) 
wgamma -0.158 -0.128** -0.174 -0.131** 
 (0.0919) (0.0475) (0.0924) (0.0478) 
wphi -0.0815 -0.0778 -0.0682 0.00132 
 (0.391) (0.113) (0.391) (0.114) 
wfreedom 1.674 -0.296 2.712 -0.291 
 (1.389) (0.656) (1.385) (0.658) 
fta 0.468* 0.408*** 0.434* 0.433*** 
 (0.182) (0.110) (0.183) (0.111) 
wfta 4.315 1.929 2.777 1.676 
 (4.556) (2.197) (4.588) (2.212) 
politics 0.000705 0.000534 -0.000289 -0.000270 
 (0.000802) (0.000492) (0.000328) (0.000209) 
wpolitics -0.00333 0.00169 -0.00490 0.00357 
 (0.00814) (0.00414) (0.00811) (0.00415) 
_cons -46.81 -47.67** -56.88 -56.07** 
 (29.54) (17.55) (29.27) (17.38)
N 2026 2602 1943 2478
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Notes
1 Switzerland ranks higher than the Netherlands but is not used as the coverage of recipient countries 
was not as wide ranging as the Dutch FDI. 
2  http://www.freetheworld.com/
  http://www.icgg.org/corruption.index.html 
4  http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
5  National People's Congress (1986), Promulgated by Order No. 9 of the President of the People's 
Republic of China and effective as of April 12, 1986.
6  Bilateral political distance is included for all source and host country pairs in the earlier analysis and 
as described in the Data Annex except for Germany as a source due to data limitations in the original 
dataset.  
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